United kingdom and cayman islands relationship review agenda

Bermuda and Great Britain

The Territories are Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, For many years the relationship between the COTs and the UK was rather ad hoc – a .. [xxxix] For Montserrat, the review found most of the islands. banks were . and scandals in the Territories, rather than putting forward a positive agenda. Jun 12, The United Kingdom's 14 Overseas Territories are an integral part of . and each has its own relationship with the UK. .. Cayman Islands; Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri .. the Government remains committed to meeting. UKOTs in the Caribbean - Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), the . high-level Meeting at PAHO HQ in Washington, in July results at each level, the relationship between planning and accountability and the respective.

British Information Services in New York answers questions about Britain and provides up to date Government comment on current events involving Britain. Bermuda and the European Union: Britons who are not also Bermudians have none of the rights that Bermudians in the UK now have if they apply for UK passports.

It was the UK Government that approved that Bermudians could have, on application, a UK passport and be treated as full UK nationals in every other way, but that Britons in Bermuda who are not also Bermudian would not have reciprocal rights. The set of rules, agreed by the UK and Bermuda Governments, that govern financial procedures under which the Bermuda Government, as a British Overseas Territory, operates.

The British-UK governorship of Bermuda For much of the last century it was given to a senior British UK military officer on retirement, or a politician who had held senior office.

The last of the latter type was David Waddington, Baroness Thatcher's last home secretary who as Lord Waddington was governor from until Since then the post has been held by career diplomats and often, when socio-economic conditions require it, comes with a knighthood for the holder.

One of the functions of the British Governor is to read the Throne Speech. Bermuda's Government House is where the Governor lives, with his family. It is a Union Jack but in its center it has the Bermuda arms on a white disc encircled by a green garland. They include a full dress blue and tropical cotton drill. It is based on old British military Field Marshals, with a white pith helmet with dyed scarlet swan's feathers plumage and Mameluke sword by Wilkinson Sword.

The main challenge for a Bermuda Governor is to balance two sometimes contradictory functions.

Cayman Islands 'let down' by UK

First, he is the primary source of information from Bermuda to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the state of affairs in Bermuda. Bermuda, despite its tiny size, is wealthy enough not to need the support from the United Kingdom some other overseas territories get. Paid for by Bermuda - not British - taxpayers and coming under Bermuda - not British - laws.

He makes periodic recommendations to increase efficiency and effectiveness. She also has experience in counter-narcotics work, justice reform, international organized crime and HIV prevention.

Ms Crocket thanked her predecessor for her support. As the second female Deputy Governor, I will continue to contribute where I can and to continue to celebrate equality and diversity.

A new deputy governor will take over from Ginny Ferson, the Governor announced today. Alison Crocket, an expert in anti-corruption work, will replace Ms Ferson in August. Her present post is head of the anti-corruption unit in the Foreign Office. She earlier served in Vienna, Austria, where she worked on counter-narcotics programmes, justice reform and international organized crime, as well as HIV prevention and public health programmes. Ms Crocket, who has two adult daughters, will be accompanied by her long-term partner, Pete.

These are very disturbing images for anyone to see. Our first priority should be the safety and well-being of the people we serve. As these are very challenging times, we must be mindful that we still are one people. Bermuda's first female Deputy Governor was sworn in at a ceremony at Government House. A career diplomat, Mrs. She replaces David Arkley. A mother of two, Mrs. The duties of the Deputy Governor include being an ex-officio notary public who can perform or notarize anything on behalf of the Bermuda Government but may not receive a fee for this service.

Mr Rankin told the assembled group that he was delighted to be in Bermuda and looked forward to working with them in the best interests of all Bermudians.

The new Governor will be sworn in at a ceremony in the Town of St George at 11am tomorrow. According to a Government House spokeswoman, Acting Governor Ginny Ferson will continue to hold the post until December, when Mr Rankin is expected to arrive on the island. In a statement, Mr Rankin said: Bermuda has a well-deserved reputation as a vibrant place to do business and an attractive place to live or to visit.

Speaking to The Telegraph about the disaster, Mr Rankin said: Seeing people in a confused condition, people standing there not really knowing what had happened, people trying to get themselves to open ground. But I can appreciate how terrifying it must have been for people who were in a more exposed situation.

The lawn later became temporary home for British medics and firefighters who traveled to Nepal to assist with recovery efforts. He lost the sight of his left eye resulting from the attack. His wife is Margaret. It is understood he was late for a dinner party where his wife Margaret was waiting, when he took a short cut through the cemetery.

He was allegedly punched to the ground after getting out his BlackBerry mobile phone to check the address of his hosts. Scotland Yard said a "small quantity" of cash was taken and, at this early stage, officers were satisfied that robbery was the only motive. They have yet to make any arrests and say inquires are continuing.

The robber was black, aged between 25 and 35, and around 5ft 10 ins. He was wearing a dark hooded top and dark glasses. Mr Fergusson, who was educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford, managed to keep hold of his mobile phone and after the incident, called his wife to tell him he was going to be late before walking to Charing Cross hospital for help.

Mr Fergusson, whose wife works for the British Council, also spent four years as Consul-General in Boston before being seconded in to the UK Cabinet Office as head of the foreign policy team. Mr Fergusson was born abroad while his father served abroad as a senior soldier. His grandfather had also been governor-general of New Zealand and two of his great grandfathers were its governors when it was a colony.

According to the Daily Mail newspaper in the UK, his family history has been plagued by tragedy: One of his middle names is Raukawa, a Maori word in recognition of the family's long association with the country. Several months after his arrival, inspecting the Bermuda Regiment, of which as Governor he is Commander-in-Chief.

Candidates for honours can be nominated at any time, with forms available at gov. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office form is used for recipients living outside Britain. FCO guidelines stress that nominees should never be informed by those considering putting them forward for honour.

Individuals only, rather than groups, can be nominated for honours, Details are also given on the British Government site at gov. Sebastian Coe is the chairman of the eight-man committee responsible for sports nominations, which can be lobbied to secure the top recognition for Clyde Best.

Bermuda laws Britons who are not Bermudians coming to Bermuda as visitors must bring valid passports and other relevant travel documents and comply with the same laws as other non-citizens. When a year old Canadian teenager visited Bermuda on vacation inshe was repeatedly raped, sodomized, tortured and murdered. Inthe UK abolished the law against double jeopardy, as a result of which murderers have at last been brought to full justice.

But there has been no such improvement in Bermuda laws. Even children born in Bermuda are not Bermudian under Bermuda law unless one parent is. No other country has such restrictions. But in Bermuda for the permanently disabled, the act gives them no such protection at all. But campaigners have fought to end compulsory military service and some concessions have been made to create an all-voluntary Royal Bermuda Regiment.

Britain itself formally ended national service in Bermuda and the UK, timeline The discussions were part of an inquiry into the future of Overseas Territories in relation to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The London Office is staffed by an expert team who provide leadership and daily interaction at the highest levels of the UK Government. I informed the Governor before leaving Bermuda for London that I would not be appearing before the committee. Bermuda got a brief mention when Sharlene Cartwright- Robinson, the Premier of the Turks and Caicos Islands, was asked if the territory planned to emulate Bermuda in permitting same-sex marriages.

The committee received written evidence from across the territories in September. Bermuda snubbed a meeting with British parliamentarians in London yesterday. Mr Brown attended a round of meetings on beneficial ownership at Lancaster House in London yesterday, organized by Tariq Ahmad, the UK junior minister responsible for the Overseas Territories.

He was speaking as he and Mr Burt prepared to travel back to Bermuda today. Passports were taken over by Britain last year and a new code on the documents has caused problems for some Bermudians traveling through the United States from outside the island. Britain took responsibility for the printing of Bermuda passports last year on security grounds.

But the coding for the travel documents was changed, which has hampered travel for Bermudians with UK-printed passports who want to enter the United States from jurisdictions outside the island. Minister Brown and I will continue to push until an acceptable solution is in place. But Bermudian travelers are permitted to enter America without an Esta under an agreement with the US. Bermuda passport of a registered Bermudian The association was set up to promote the interests of the Overseas Territories in Britain and encourage co-operation among the jurisdictions.

Premier David Burt will host a reception for Bermudians in Nottingham during his upcoming trip to Britain. The event will be the first of its kind in the region and will be open to Bermudians studying and living in Britain.

To reserve a spot, e-mail eventslondonoffice gov. David Burt, the Premier, is scheduled to hear more on Brexit this month during a trip to London. It came as an unpopular draft deal for the withdrawal from the European Union sparked political turmoil yesterday for Theresa May, the British Prime Minister.

A tentative Brexit deal would include a month transition period after the exit date of March 29, British trade would be subject to EU tariffs and cross-border travel would likely revert to the days of Customs and passport checks.

However, a government spokeswoman said: Bermuda in particular, Bermudians think of themselves as Bermudians, and becoming more legislatively connected with Britain would cause unease. For much of the last years the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands shared a constitutional link with Jamaica, as its dependencies.

The link was broken when Jamaica gained its independence inwhile the two dependencies preferred to maintain a strong relationship with the UK. After its separation from Jamaica, the Cayman Islands gained its own constitution under WIA and then followed a period of economic growth, with few constitutional problems, and little constitutional change.

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Conversely, the Turks and Caicos Islands went through a period of great economic, political and constitutional upheaval in the mid to late s. These measures guaranteed a substantial level of Crown control over the Territory. Anguilla did not fully become a separate entity untiland as a consequence its constitutional development was restricted.

What is most apparent, however, is that the UK government, through the reserved powers of the Governor has the upper hand when it comes to overseeing policy-making in the Territories.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the UK government does attempt to consult with the COTs on matters of importance, and is reluctant to openly overrule local governments and legislatures. Furthermore, the UK relationship with the Territories is made more difficult by the different degrees of autonomy for each of the COTs, which can cause problems both for the Crown and the local Territory administration.

Despite the difficulties, the constitutional link with the UK retains its popularity, in particular because it helps to preserve a degree of political stability for the Territories. A related area of advantage is the Territories sometimes-uncertain constitutional relationship with the UK. As has been noted the constitutional arrangements that link the Territories with the metropolis are rather ill defined with the Territories having autonomy in some areas, but maintaining close ties with the UK in others.

The quasi-independent status that exists provides room for manoeuvre in political and economic matters, and creates an ambiguity, which attracts international financial capital. In short, the Territories recognise the advantages of retaining their present status.

By the end of British colonial responsibilities in the Caribbean extended to only five very small Territories — in fact the five Territories that remain under UK authority today.

Although the paper was given the correct figure, it took the FCO another two and half hours to discover the Territories names. On an institutional level there were also problems. One particularly ill-conceived change was the disbursement of responsibility for the Territories after the closure of the DTD in Rather than a single bureaucracy overseeing all the Territories, FCO responsibility was dispersed between six geographical departments: Further, the fact that the majority of Governorships were awarded to FCO staff as preretirement postings meant that the necessary dynamic representation at the Territory level was not present.

Therefore at all levels of UK authority, the interest in, and concern for the Dependent Territories was not present. As a consequence a rather laissez-faire attitude existed, but this was not too last. The re-engagement on the part of the UK in the overseas dependencies, and indeed the Caribbean more generally was prompted by two particular considerations.

These arrests represented the tip of far broader problems of corruption and drug trafficking. The British Attorney-General was exposed over improper land sales, while British Governor John Strong regarded his post as a pre-retirement haven and avoided taking action to address the growing problems. The UK government realised that a halfhearted approach to the Territories was not sufficient to secure acceptable standards of political and economic conduct in the local administrations.

The strong criticisms by the US also brought home to the UK that it had to make sure that its Dependent Territories in the Caribbean maintained acceptable international standards of governance. Indeed, for the first time since the West Indies Act of became law, the UK recognised that it needed to use its power to enforce good practice when required. Once the UK began to recognise its responsibilities, a broader review of policy towards the Dependent Territories was undertaken.

The review examined factors for and against independence, the costs and benefits of the Dependent Territories, a range of future statuses, and the requirements underlying further moves towards independence.

Cayman Islands 'let down' by UK - Telegraph

The first real test of the more pro-active British policy came in when a banking scandal was uncovered in Montserrat. However, the subsequent response of the British government was criticised by some on the island, and highlighted the contentious nature of extended statehood when British concerns override local interests.

The origins of the dispute came in February when having received reports of widespread failure in licensing and supervision of banks across the Caribbean Territories, the FCO appointed Rodney Gallagher, of the consultants Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, to carry out a review of their offshore financial sectors. Subsequently, over 90 percent of the banks on Montserrat had their licences revoked. They also questioned the professionalism of the Gallagher enquiry. The local opposition did have some effect on the British government in that it withdrew a number of controversial provisions, such as the one giving the Governor the power to legislate.

Having followed a policy of benign neglect for so many years it was always going to take some time for the UK authorities to readjust to the subtleties of extended statehood. Nevertheless, the UK was the sovereign power, and ultimate authority rested with the Crown. After the serious disagreements over the constitutional reform process in Montserrat there was an expectation that the UK would become more receptive to local sensitivities, but in the government implemented the Caribbean Abolition of Death Penalty for Murder Order, again without consulting the Territories.

However, there had not been an execution in any of the Territories for many years. Nevertheless, in May the British government abolished the death penalty in the Dependent Territories, doing so without the involvement of the UK Parliament, other than to lay a Statutory Instrument before it — the Caribbean Abolition of Death Penalty for Murder Order.

Statutory Instruments allow ministers or the Queen in Council to pass legislative measures without formal parliamentary oversight. The UK government announced its intention to implement the change on 28 Marchleaving little opportunity for the Territories to debate the matter. The principles of extended statehood would suggest that the Dependent Territories should recognise and adopt international norms for human rights in order to play a full role in the international sphere.

However, the fact that the death penalty was abolished via an Order in Council meant that the measure was effectively imposed without any input from the House of Commons or the Territories themselves.

Such conduct generated tremendous ill feeling among many in the Territories, because they felt that the Order encroached upon an area of responsibility formerly overseen at the local level. The tensions inherent in the operation of extended statehood are well highlighted in the death penalty example, because there was a clear difference between British and Dependent Territory attitudes over the issue.

From the preceding examples of offshore finance and the death penalty it is evident that the UK government was prepared to play a more hands on role in relation to its Dependent Territories. However, appearances were deceptive and question marks remained about how all-embracing UK policy was. It was true that the British authorities had acted to resolve a number of high profile issues, which had concerned them in relation to the Dependent Territories.

But to a large extent British interventions were reactive and piecemeal in nature. There was no strong, identifiable set of priorities that defined and guided UK policy. A number of observations have been made, which illustrate the concern.

There were accusations that the FCO had not improved the quality of officials working with Dependent Territory governments.

It is clear from this that the UK was in a very difficult position trying to balance particular Territory interests. However, the British realised that such conflicting demands could perhaps be mitigated by a more structured and coherent relationship with its Territories. In addition, an interdepartmental ministerial group was created for the Dependent Territories, chaired by the FCO minister responsible for the Caribbean.

In January ministers proposed the introduction of jointly agreed Country Policy Plans for each of the Caribbean Territories aimed at identifying policy priorities to which both governments would be committed. For example, in all of the Caribbean Territories introduced legislation to facilitate international cooperation against drug trafficking and to comply with the requirements of the UN Drugs Convention. Other measures included improving the administration of justice and streamlining the methods of budgetary and financial accountability.

It is true there was a clear re-engagement with the Caribbean on the part of the UK government from the mids, but there was no comprehensive plan of action.

To a large extent the UK was forced to respond to crises and scandals in the Territories, rather than putting forward a positive agenda. As a consequence, extended statehood was rather ill defined and uneven, with some of the Territories themselves wanting, or indeed needing, a stronger lead from London. And even then, the situation remained problematic. Volcanic Eruptions and Contingent Liabilities There was an expectation, certainly on the part of the UK government, that the reforms instituted in the early s would lead to a more effective and responsive relationship with its Dependent Territories in the Caribbean.

These two developments highlighted significant deficiencies in the operation of extended statehood, and would precipitate a wholesale review of the constitutional, political, economic and social settlement between the Dependent Territories and the UK. As was reported by 26 December when the most extreme explosive event took place … approximately 90 percent of the resident population of over 10, had had to relocate at least once and over two-thirds had left the island.

Virtually all the important infrastructure of the island was destroyed or put out of use for the short to medium term. The private sector collapsed and the economy became largely dependent on British aid.

In his memorandum of evidence to the International Development Committee, David Taylor, Governor of Montserrat from stated, The Constitutional and Administrative arrangements in normal times were unsatisfactory enough without having to cope with an open-ended emergency. A number of areas of particular concern were highlighted. The DFID report criticised the triangular relationship between Montserrat, Barbados via the Dependent Territories Regional Secretariat and London for creating unnecessary confusion and prolonging the process of decision-making.

Further the attempt by UK government departments to work within existing managerial arrangements was criticised for impeding an effective response. Ad hoc arrangements had to be put in place, and this was done reactively as the eruption progressed. Further, there was no clear budgetary ceiling or jointly accepted standards on what level of spending was appropriate, which resulted in delaying the disbursement of funds.

Beyond the bureaucratic issues raised as a consequence of the Montserrat crisis, the volcano also focused attention on the issue of citizenship rights. With much of the island under ash, many Montserratians had to make the judgement about whether to leave or stay.

The UK government reacted, albeit with some delay, to enable islanders to travel to the UK, be housed, settled and educated. However, the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of and introduced controls that greatly restricted the ability of Territory citizens to settle. While all rights to remain were ended by the Immigration Act of The Montserrat crisis highlighted the lack of legal status for Dependent Territory citizens, and reminded the British government of this anomaly.

At about the same time as the Montserrat crisis was at its height and the first official reports on the situation were being published, the National Audit Office investigated the action taken by the FCO to minimise the risk of potential contingent liabilities falling on the UK resulting from the actions of the Territories. More specifically, the investigation considered issues such as disaster preparedness, offshore financial services and budgetary control in the Territories.

The report found that despite the FCO having undertaken a number of initiatives since to identify and minimise the risk of contingent liabilities in the Dependent Territories, the UK remained exposed. It is clear that both the NAO and the Committee of Public Accounts felt that the attempts to re-engage with the Dependent Territories in the late s and early s had not been that successful.

There was still the impression that the FCO and the British government more generally retained a rather detached relationship with the dependencies with resultant risks for both sides.

As early as August the new government established an interdepartmental Montserrat Action Group to co-ordinate relief activity, while in September the Crisis Investment Programme was created as part of a new coherent response to all aspects of the emergency.

In short, the Labour government was aiming to strengthen and deepen the application of extended statehood to its dependencies in the Caribbean. The process of review was supported by an enquiry conducted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons in late and an earlier debate in the House of Lords.

On the constitutional issue, the White Paper reported that there was a clear wish on the part of the Territories to retain their connection with Britain, and not move towards independence. Other constitutional arrangements were considered, including integration into the UK and Crown Dependency status similar to the Channel Islands, but were rejected in favour of maintaining existing practice. However, it was agreed that a process of constitutional review would be carried out in an attempt to update existing provisions, and that if any Territory wanted independence in the future Britain would not stand in its way.

These included effective regulation of their offshore financial sectors, observance of human rights such as, legalising homosexuality among consenting adultsand good governance. Further, the White Paper documented the changes that had been introduced to improve the administrative links between the UK and the Territories. The Montserrat crisis and the associated parliamentary reports had highlighted the inadequacies of existing mechanisms, and precipitated action on the part of the British government to reconfigure its bureaucratic ties with the Dependent Territories.

For example, the UK for the first time appointed a dedicated minister for the Territories and established a new department within the FCO the Overseas Territories Department to replace the previously fragmented structure across six separate departments.

It was also decided that parallel departments for the Territories in both the FCO and DFID should be created, together with a ministerial joint liaison committee to coordinate their activities. This change was instituted to streamline and simplify the organisational arrangements between the UK and the Territories.

While a new political forum, the Overseas Territories Consultative Council was established to bring together British ministers and Territory representatives to discuss matters of concern. This was the first time that a formal body had been established to bring together politicians from both sides.

Previously, Ministers and officials in London used the Governors to convey information. The first meeting of the Council took place in Octoberand gatherings have since been held annually. Finally, a senior British civil servant was appointed in Brussels to liase with the Territories on matters related to the work of the European Union, in order to improve their knowledge of, and representation in, the organisation. One decision related to the Territories change in nomenclature, and the other extended British citizenship to those living in the Territories that met certain conditions.

A number of Territory representatives had asked for the name change believing that it better reflected the nature of a post-colonial partnership at the end of the twentieth century. A majority of the Territories at this point were not receiving any budgetary assistance from the UK and consequently felt that they were not really dependent on the British government.

UK citizenship rights for Territory residents were gradually restricted under a series of Immigration Acts in the s and early s. The final change came with the British Nationality Actwhich created a British Dependent Territories citizenship, a status separate from those with British citizenship. Only the latter group had the right of abode in the UK. Issues raised included the fact that citizens of Dependent Territories were required to obtain leave to enter the UK at ports of entry, which involved queuing with all other non-UK and non-European citizens[xcv]; that student tuition fees were charged at the higher overseas rate; and there was no right to work in the UK.

The British Overseas Territories Bill was published in Junewhich set out the provisions required to amend the existing legislation. The subsequent Act received its Royal Assent on 26 Februaryand the citizenship provisions took effect on 21 May The Act confers British citizenship on those citizens in the Territories who qualify and who wish to have it, and allows the right of abode in the UK and the right of free movement and residency in EU and European Economic Area member states.

For these rights and obligations to be attained individuals in the Overseas Territories have to apply for a British passport to show documentary evidence of their new status and to facilitate travel. The provisions of the Act were also non-reciprocal, which prevented British and other EU citizens from travelling to, and establishing residency in, the Territories.

By the end ofsome 6, citizens from the Overseas Territories had applied for British Citizen passports. The desire of a new administration to assert its influence over problematic policy areas, as the Overseas Territories were deemed to be, was an important factor underpinning the FCO led examination. In addition, the fact that the Labour Party had been out of power for eighteen years heightened the expectations of new thinking and new approaches.

White Paper did indicate that the Labour government was serious in attempting to overcome longstanding problems in the UK-Overseas Territories relationship. The recommendations of the White Paper focused on issues such as the constitutional settlement, citizenship, financial standards, good governance and human rights, which all had been areas of contention through the late s and into the s. In its general language, the Labour government also made plain its desire for a relationship that secured the interests of both parties based on sound political, economic and social principles.

In many ways the White Paper laid down an ideal framework for the successful operation of extended statehood. The extension of UK citizenship rights to the Overseas Territories, the emphasis placed on meeting international standards of good practice, the importance given to the promotion of transparent, accountable government, and a concern for environmental protection all seemed to indicate that the Overseas Territories were now better placed to play a full and active role in an increasingly globalised world.

However, the more proactive attitude of the UK government created new tensions, which highlight the limitations of extended statehood notwithstanding the attempts to improve its operation. Beyond the White Paper: However, in order to consider the nature of the relationship sincean analysis of the practical effects of the White Paper must be undertaken. Areas highlighted include the human rights legislation needed to bring Overseas Territories more into line with the international obligations to which the UK is subject, the new approach with regard to the crisis in Montserrat, and perhaps most controversially the attempt to tighten regulation in the COTs offshore financial industries.

However, the issue of decriminalising consensual private homosexual acts between adults was more problematic.

Despite lengthy consultation with the Caribbean Territories, involving governments, religious and social leaders, the media and the general public, there remained strong resistance to the decriminalisation of homosexual acts. Many in the Territories believed the issue was a local one, and local views and predispositions should take precedence over British demands. However, in earlyin spite of widespread controversy the UK government passed an Order in Council to force the change in legislation.

The British action highlighted their determination to enforce basic standards of human rights, but it is interesting to observe that although the law was changed the view of many in the Overseas Territories has not. The issue of homosexuality remains a very contentious issue in the Territories, and is sustained to an extent by the conservative attitudes of the Anglican Church in the region.

For example, Anglican Archbishop Drexel Gomez, the most senior priest in the West Indies, stated recently that all the churches over which he presides including those in the Overseas Territories stand totally opposed to homosexuality on biblical and historical grounds.

Although the UK forced the Territories to change the law, the fact that local views remain unaltered indicates that the application of extended statehood cannot always overcome deeply held local values. Therefore no matter what improvements are made to the functioning of the extended statehood model, limits and constraints will always be present.