leader-followers, and network analysis of segmented transcripts of those and as situational leadership theory stipulates the relationship does not have one. they had on the relationship between leaders and followers. .. Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory. 71 . followers in different work situations. Sep 29, how the interaction between leader, followers, and situation as a single element in relation to leadership as argued by experts. Indicators of problems in leadership at National University will be studied and analyzed the.
Discuss how leadership and management can be solutions to different problems. Discuss the difficulty and complexity of effective leadership; there is no single approach that always works. Leadership is more than just the kind of person the leader is or the things the leader does. The clearest picture of the leadership process occurs only when you use all three perspectives to understand it.
The leader The followers The situation A particular leadership situation scenario can be examined using each level of analysis separately. Examining interactions in the area of overlaps can lead to better understanding. Leadership is the result of complex interactions among the leader, the followers, and the situation. Unique personal history Interests Character traits Motivation Training As human beings effective leaders differ from their followers, and from ineffective leaders on elements such as: Personality traits, cognitive abilities Skills, values Within the military you may find situations where the best leader is NOT the senior individual or the formally assigned leader.
Another way personality can affect leadership is through temperament. Power can be considered to come from five sources: Position power more managerial Legitimate, formal position in the organization Reward, ability to bestow rewards Coercive, ability to punish Personal power more leader based Expert, special knowledge or skills Referent, followers emulation of the leader 10 The Followers Certain aspects of followers affect the leadership process: Other relevant variables include: Trend toward greater power sharing and decentralized authority Strategic Corporal in organizations.
Increase in complex problems and rapid changes with a wider range of missions from day to day or deployment to deployment. The situation may be the most ambiguous aspect of the leadership framework. Women are taking on leadership roles in greater numbers than ever before. Some areas of the military are still not open to females. The book seems to contradict itself a bit in this section. It says there are no differences but then the bottom of page 37 indicates there may be some at this point.
Women themselves have changed. Leadership roles have changed. Organizational practices have changed. Leaders encourage growth and development in their followers beyond the scope of the job. Leaders motivate followers through more personal and intangible factors. Leaders redefine the parameters of tasks and responsibilities.
The evolution of leader–follower reciprocity: the theory of service-for-prestige
Nevertheless, the key conceptual elements of a coherent and plausible evolutionary theory of leader—follower relations are already in place Price and Van Vugt, in pressand neuroscientists have already begun using evolutionary theories of psychological adaptation to guide their research on social interactions Rilling and Sanfey, Thus, we propose that evolutionary social psychologists and social neuroscientists should begin engaging with each other more on the topic of leader—follower relations, and thinking about ways in which evolutionary approaches to these relations could both inform and be informed by neuroscientific research.
We take this perspective on leader—follower relations, so a key question driving our analysis is: We pay close attention to past evolutionary environments, because any evolved psychological mechanisms that exist today in the minds of modern humans, including those governing leader—follower relationships, could exist only if they functioned adaptively in these environments Tooby and Cosmides, We propose that voluntary leader—follower relationships — that is, interactions in which followers voluntarily follow, and leaders voluntarily lead, because they each perceive some positive incentive to do so — were adaptive in the past for both leaders and followers because they involved mutually beneficial exchange.
Evidence suggests that prestige and dominance are two distinguishably different paths that individuals can take in order to increase their social status Von Rueden et al. The more equal the social bargaining power of leaders and followers i. However, the greater the bargaining power of leaders relative to followers, the more likely the relationship would have been to transition from being reciprocal and prestige-based to being coercive, exploitative, and dominance-based.
When followers have relatively high relative bargaining power e. In these situations, if leaders attempt to claim high status without offering followers anything in return, or by attempting to dominate and coerce followers, then their would-be followers can simply reject them e.
However, when followers have relatively low bargaining power, leaders will have increased ability to gain and maintain status based on their ability to dominate, rather than benefit, followers. For example, if followers have low power to exit a group or to strip a leader of his or her high status, then the leader will have little need to offer them benefits, in order to compel them to a stay in the group or b grant the leader high status in exchange for these benefits.
Leaders may sometimes perceive dominance, as compared to reciprocity, to be an appealingly cheap and efficient route to high status, as it saves them the costs of having to produce benefits for followers. We refer to the above theory of how and why leader—follower relationships vary from reciprocity to dominance as service-for-prestige Price and Van Vugt, in press.
As noted above, leader—follower relations have evolved in a wide variety of species to allow individuals to share information and coordinate their behavior King et al. For instance in many taxa, individuals share knowledge in order to lead followers to the locations of food, water, and other resources examples include ravens, elephants, and most famously honeybees, who map out directions to resources via waggle dances ; in many fish species, leader—follower dynamics result in groups shoals and schools that are helpful for avoiding predators and finding food; and among some primates such as chimpanzees, alpha males lead aggressive group actions against enemy groups and predators Boehm, ; Krause and Ruxton, ; King et al.
In the human lineage, just as in other species, leadership probably evolved initially to solve problems related to information sharing and social coordination. However, we propose that eventually, evolution enabled humans to use reciprocity to enhance the benefits of leadership. Such group movements present coordination problems, however, associated with determining who will lead and who will follow. For example, if Individuals A and B both have an interest in visiting a waterhole together because there is safety in numbersand have several waterholes to choose from, how will they choose which one to visit?
There are several ways in which leader—follower dynamics could emerge to solve this problem Van Vugt and Kurzban, For example, imagine that A prefers a particular waterhole but B has no preference, and as a result A moves first to choose the preferred waterhole.
The evolution of leader–follower reciprocity: the theory of service-for-prestige
Once A has made this move, B is best off following A, as opposed to making a dangerous solo journey to a waterhole that offers B no additional benefits. Leadership may have evolved in many species to solve coordination problems such as these, when there has been a fitness advantage to the individual in assuming a leadership role Van Vugt, However, what about situations in which the individual is disadvantaged by assuming a leadership role?
Many leadership roles may involve substantial costs to leaders, and individuals may need special incentives to accept these roles.
This potential for reciprocity could provide new opportunities for leadership to evolve, such that leader—follower relations could become not just matters of coordination but also matters of exchange.
We propose that leader—follower relations evolved as service-for-prestige transactions in contexts such as these, to enable leadership behaviors that would otherwise have been prohibitively costly. However, engagement in reciprocity, particularly in the complexly cooperative social environments of human beings, requires specially designed social-cognitive abilities that are uniquely sophisticated in humans Tooby and Cosmides, ; Hammerstein, ; Tooby et al.
Therefore, we propose that service-for-prestige exchange is a crucial aspect of leader—follower dynamics in humans, but not necessarily in any other species. One of our key theoretical tools, therefore, will be the main concept used by evolutionists to explain non-kin cooperation: Reciprocity theories assume that because cooperative individuals incur fitness costs in order to deliver fitness benefits to others, they must receive some return benefit from others as compensation for these costs.
In the absence of such compensation, cooperation will be maladaptive for cooperators and will not evolve. For example, if X pays a cost of size 1 to provide Y with a benefit of size 2, and Y precisely returns the favor, then X and Y will each have paid a cost of 1 and received a benefit 2, and the exchange will be mutually profitable.
In order for reciprocity to evolve in direct exchange contexts, cooperators must somehow avoid being exploited by cheaters, for example, by avoiding them altogether, or by neutralizing their advantage via punishment. If cheaters consistently tend to come out ahead in these interactions, they will eventually exploit cooperators to extinction and cooperation will not evolve Hamilton, ; Trivers, ; Henrich, ; Price and Johnson, Individuals should thus be predisposed to cooperate with reciprocators, and be averse to cooperating with cheaters.
This prediction is supported by a large body of evidence from several behavioral science fields Price, a. Reciprocity has long been considered a fundamental attribute of human social systems cross-culturally Gouldner,and it is generally considered to be a universal, species-typical, and highly fitness-relevant human behavior Brown, ; Rilling and Sanfey, The reciprocity theory presented by Trivers primarily describes reciprocity that is direct and dyadic i.
However, extensions of this theory have been used to explain other forms of reciprocity. There have also been attempts to apply reciprocity theory to direct exchanges between one individual and a group of other individuals Boyd and Richerson, ; Price,a ; Tooby et al.
Because leader—follower relations often although not exclusively involve interaction between one leader and multiple followers, this kind of reciprocity would seem most relevant to an understanding of leader—follower exchange.
However, it is not widely accepted among evolutionary researchers that direct reciprocity can explain the evolution of cooperation in group contexts such as these Boyd and Richerson, ; Henrich, ; Bowles and Gintis, In the view of these researchers, direct reciprocity can explain the evolution of simple dyadic cooperation, but totally different processes such as cultural group selection are required to explain cooperation in groups.
Our application of reciprocity to these contexts, then, does not represent the consensus view of evolutionary researchers, and important theoretical questions still need to be resolved about precisely how leader—follower exchange could evolve.
Nevertheless, despite this lack of a theoretical consensus, we agree with previous suggestions Price,a ; Tooby et al. We propose that reciprocity theory provides the most appropriate and predictive evolutionary framework for understanding voluntary human leader—follower interactions, because 1 leaders often incur costs in their efforts to provide benefits for followers, 2 followers often incur costs in order to provide prestige which benefits leaders, 3 in order for each of these costly provisioning behaviors to be adaptive in the ancestral past, both leaders and followers would have needed to recoup these costs somehow, and 4 this recoupment could plausibly have occurred via a process in which leader-produced benefits were exchanged for follower-produced prestige.
Illustrations of why it is often costly for leaders to provide public goods and for followers to provide prestige, and of why prestige entails fitness benefits, are presented below.
Service-for-prestige regards leader—follower reciprocity as a collective action problem because many benefits provided by a leader e. The public goods provided by the leader will often be costly to produce, and if increased prestige is what motivates the leader to pay these production costs as service-for-prestige predictsthen followers must succeed in providing the leader with prestige, in order to maintain production of these public goods.
If the prestige allocated to leaders is costly for individual followers to provide, then its allocation will present a collective action problem for followers Price, ; Price and Van Vugt, in press. To understand why prestige allocation should constitute a collective action problem for followers, it helps to first consider social power more abstractly. Emerson provides a simple and useful definition of social power when he notes the reciprocal relationship between power and dependence: However, note that these two paths to status will rarely be completely distinct, since traits that lead to prestige can frequently lead to dominance, and vice versa; Henrich and Gil-White, ; Von Rueden et al.
We believe that conceptualizing prestige in this way, and distinguishing it from dominance, are useful means of understanding the different ways in which leaders can acquire status.
However, unlike the service-for-prestige theory we present here, Henrich and Gil-White regard prestige as something that is offered in exchange not for public goods but for a private good: In their view, individuals with high levels of expertise are allocated prestige by those who wish to learn from and copy their behavior; by allocating prestige to an expert i.
Although we do agree that prestige allocation may often occur as a way to compensate experts for providing private goods, we suggest that it also often occurs as a way to compensate leaders for providing public goods. If prestige is indeed allocated in exchange for public goods, and if prestige and its behavioral consequences are indeed costly to produce, then it becomes easy to see why the allocation of prestige to leaders will entail a collective action problem.
In order for followers to motivate leaders to provide public goods, they must collectively pay the costs of respect. For example, consider a leader who routinely incurs costs e. His services enable his followers to acquire public goods such as better territory, shared resources, and increased group status. Follower 1 is respectful, and tends to engage in costly acts that benefit the leader e.
Because each follower in this scenario has a personal incentive to free ride, there is the risk that the collective effort will fail to produce sufficient prestige to compensate the leader for the costs of providing public goods. Just like cheaters in reciprocal exchanges, free riders in collective actions will exploit cooperators to extinction unless their advantages are neutralized Yamagishi, ; Boyd and Richerson, The collective action scenario described here is unusual in that it is a collective action for the purpose of engaging in reciprocity.
Collective actions are typically conceptualized as functioning to produce or acquire some shared material resource for example, a group of citizens jointly generating tax revenue, or a group of hunters jointly killing a large game animalbut in this case, the joint effort is focused on producing sufficient prestige to compensate the leader for services rendered. As a result, Follower 2 above is in the unusual position of simultaneously representing both a cheater in a reciprocal interaction for failing to engage in a service-for-prestige transaction with the leader and a free rider in a collective action for failing to cooperate with fellow followers in collectively producing prestige for the leader.
Follower 2 will therefore be a prime target for hostility within the group: We say more about this prediction and related predictions below. Because psychological adaptations evolved in ancestral environments that may be quite different in certain respects than present environments, we cannot always expect for adaptations to function adaptively in modern societies Tooby and Cosmides, A common example is human gustatory preferences for fats, sugars, and salts.
Because these nutrients were essential but difficult to acquire in ancestral environments, people have apparently evolved to be strongly motivated to consume them. These motivations may function maladaptively in environments where these nutrients are easily obtained, by leading to health problems associated with over-consumption Nesse and Williams, Some aspects of leader—follower relations may represent mismatches with modern environments Van Vugt et al. The available evidence suggests that leadership and followership are universal aspects of human nature: Leadership is used in these societies to facilitate cooperation in activities such as warfare, forging political alliances, maintaining within-group order, big game hunting, and moving camp Service, ; Johnson and Earle,all of which are vital to the success, status, and fitness of individuals living in groups.
Ethnographic accounts of leaders in these domains generally describe the leaders as men, rather than women Service, ; Johnson and Earle, However, although women only rarely hold the most directly influential political positions in small-scale societies, they commonly lead in more indirect ways by exerting substantial influence on political affairs Low, ; Yanca and Low, ; Bowser and Patton, A common observation about leadership in small-scale societies is that it tends to be informal and based on achievement Fried, ; Kelly, Compared to leaders in industrialized societies, these leaders have little power to force others to do what they say.
This is especially true in nomadic hunter-gatherer societies, which, compared to sedentary small-scale societies, involve smaller group sizes and lower population densities. There are usually no formal leadership offices or duties in nomadic hunter-gatherer societies, and leaders tend to lead by persuasion and demonstrations of their expertise and ability to benefit others Service, ; Johnson and Earle, Nomadic hunter-gatherers rarely recognize anyone as a formal headman and tend to express low tolerance for domineering leaders Service, ; Turnbull, ; Lee, Small-scale societies also tend to recognize different leaders in different domains cf.
Leadership requires expertise, and different people may have expertise in different activities Service, For instance, the leader of a hunting expedition may not be the same person who organizes an alliance with a friendly group or a raid against an unfriendly one. The traditional authority system of the Navajo, for example, included war leaders, peace leaders who organized friendly political interactionshunt leaders, medical leaders, and ceremonial song leaders Shepardson, By assisting the group in domains such as political relations with external groups, maintenance of internal order, big game hunting, and camp movements, leaders provided followers with public goods.
For instance, success in war can bring a wide variety of collective benefits, including increased access to territory, mates, and other resources Keeley,and success in hunting large game produces meat that is widely shared among the entire residential group Kelly, Leaders often incur large costs to generate these public goods.
Big game hunting, for example, can involve large investments of time and effort and significant risks. War leadership represents another example of costly public goods provisioning; war leaders gain reputations for bravery by taking risks for example, fighting in the front lines that enable their groups to effectively compete for resources Meggitt, ; Chagnon, Why are leaders willing to incur large costs in order to provide followers with public goods?
Plausibly because provisioning of public goods is a key way in which members of small-scale groups can acquire social status Price,ab. Because leaders in small-scale societies have little power to coerce and dominate followers, their high status appears to be more similar to voluntarily conferred prestige than to dominance Henrich and Gil-White, ; Van Vugt and Ahuja, These leaders benefit from their high status: In a community of Tsimane hunter-horticulturalists, the most prestigious and influential men did not receive more shared food over the short-term, but were more likely to receive social support e.
Similarly, magnanimous leadership among the Martu Aborigines in Australia is believed to be rewarded over the long-term with social and political support Bird and Bliege Bird, A further important way in which status enhances male fitness in these societies is by contributing to reproductive success.
Status is attractive both to women Ellis, ; Li, and to parents who wish to betroth their daughter to a high status man as a way of creating a useful ally Hart and Pilling, ; Kelly, Ethnographic evidence suggests that in these societies, higher status men — or leaders — have more wives and sexual partners, as well as higher-fertility wives and more surviving offspring Levi-Strauss, ; Chagnon,; Betzig, ; Von Rueden et al.
The importance of leadership in small-scale societies tends to correlate positively with the degree to which settlement patterns are sedentary as opposed to nomadic, because sedentism permits larger residential group sizes and higher population density Fried, ; Johnson and Earle, ; Marlowe, When groups are larger, coordination and collective action problems involved in group action are harder to solve, and leadership is relatively more important Carneiro, ; Tooby et al.
Within-group disputes between members e. Groups may break apart or join together, depending on the abundance of local resources and the quality of social relationships within the group Turnbull, ; Kelly, This arrangement makes it relatively easy for group members to escape a leader who becomes too dominant.
But with increases in sedentism and population density, fission—fusion social organization becomes less tenable, and followers become less capable of exiting groups with dominant leaders Boehm, ; Price and Van Vugt, in press.